We consider a secondary spectrum market where primaries set prices for their unused channels. The payoff of a primary then depends on the availability of channels for its competitors, which a primary might not have information about. We study a model where a primary can acquire this competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries, where each primary decides whether to acquire the C-CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. We first characterize the Nash equilibrium of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases, where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also show that surprisingly the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases or primaries have different availabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
S PECTRUM sharing where license holders (primaries) allow unlicensed users (secondaries) to use their channels can enhance the efficiency of the spectrum usage. However, secondary access will only proliferate when it is rendered profitable to the primaries. We investigate a secondary spectrum market where there are competing primaries that want to lease their unused channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. In our setting, primaries can be wireless service providers or any other intermittent users of the spectrum (e.g. government agencies, TV broadcasters) or the infrastructure (e.g. access point owners) and secondaries can also be service providers or individual users. We assume the market operates in fixed time intervals. At the start of each interval, the primaries announce prices for their channels if they are available. Each secondary seeks to buy an available channel with the lowest price.
The availability of a channel varies randomly because of the usage statistic of a primary, e.g. if a primary need to use a channel to serve its own traffic, the channel will be unavailable for sale. 1 When its channel is available, the profit or payoff that a primary can obtain will depend in part on the availability of the channels of other primaries in the market.
We consider a scenario where the primary can estimate the competitor's channel state information (C-CSI) by incurring a cost. This C-CSI provides an estimate of the competitor's channel state (CCS), which indicates if it is available for sale or not. The motivation behind considering such a scenario is the growing interest in incorporating spectrum measurements into various approaches for dynamic spectrum access. For example, a recent proposal made by the FCC is to sense the occupancy of the 3.5 GHz band by environmental sensing capability (ESC) operators [2] . The cost to acquire the C-CSI can be incurred in several ways. For example, i) the primary could need to devote resources to sense the competitor's channel and estimate its traffic patterns; this could cost the primary in terms of power consumption or processing resources. ii) Alternatively, the primary could incentivize users to collaboratively crowdsource such measurements using their own wireless devices (see e.g. [3] , [4] ). Here the cost to the primary is the payments to incentivize participation. iii) Finally, these estimates could be performed by a 'third party' that deploys a network of wireless spectrum sensors as in [5] 2 and uses these to sell "forecast" of the CCS to a primary. Additionally, there may be errors in this estimation due to traffic variability, noise and hidden terminal effects. Characterizing how the C-CSI costs and errors impact the competition between the primaries is the goal of this paper. 3 We now illustrate the challenges involved in analyzing this setting. A primary with an available channel needs to select whether to acquire the C-CSI and the price for its channel. However, while taking its own decision, a primary does not know whether its competitors decided to acquire the C-CSI or not. The importance of C-CSI is immense. For example, if the competitors' channels are not available, a primary can sell its channel at the highest possible price due to a lack of competition. This suggests that a primary would want to acquire C-CSI. However, if the other primaries are available, the primary may have to select a lower price because of the competition. This lower price may not be enough to cover the C-CSI acquisition cost. Hence, it is not a priori clear whether primaries will acquire the C-CSI.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitors' decisions also complicates the pricing strategy of a primary. We now illustrate this when there are two primaries. If one primary (A) knows that the channel of the other primary (B) is available, A's pricing decision depends on if B also knows A's availability or not, as this will in turn impact the competition it faces. On the other hand, if primary A does not know B's channel state, then it must balance between selecting a lower price, which will increase its probability of selling should the competitor be present, and a higher price, which will give it more revenue should B be absent.
To address these issues, we focus on a market with two primaries (though some extensions to more than primaries are given in our archived version [6] ). The restriction to two primaries is mainly done to simplify our analysis. However, there are practical situations where this is a reasonable assumption. 4 We study a non-cooperative game with the primaries as players. When its channel is available, each primary decides i) whether to acquire the C-CSI or not, and ii) a price. If the primary acquires the C-CSI, it may select different prices depending its estimate of the CCS. When the primary does not acquire the C-CSI, it has to select a price irrespective of the CCS. We characterize the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies.
Basic Model: We first consider a basic model (Section III) where the acquired C-CSI is equal to CCS. The channel availability probability and the C-CSI acquisition costs are the same for both the primaries. We introduce a [T, p] class of strategies (Definition 4) and show that the NE strategy profile is of this form. In a [T, p] strategy, a primary acquires the C-CSI, when the cost is below T with probability (w.p.) p, and does not acquire the C-CSI, otherwise. We allow the primaries to potentially randomize their prices given the C-CSI acquired. Using this characterization, several interesting properties of the NE are shown. First, p is increase as the C-CSI cost decreases, but a primary never acquires C-CSI w.p.1. Second, T increases in the uncertainty of the CCS. Third, we have the following counter-intuitive result: the ability to acquire C-CSI does not impact the expected payoff of a primary. Finally, we show that the equilibrium pricing strategy is to randomize and we characterize the resulting price distributions.
Impact of the Estimation Error: We, subsequently, investigate the impact of C-CSI errors on the decision, payoff and the pricing strategy of a primary (Section IV). Conventional wisdom might suggest that errors in estimating the CCS should decrease the payoff. However, this is not definite because errors might also make primaries less aggressive in lowering their prices to compete against competitors when they acquire C-CSI, which could lead to higher profits.
Interestingly, we show that this is indeed the case, i.e., the primary's pay-off is higher with C-CSI errors.
We show that there again exists a [T, p] type NE strategy, where the threshold T decreases as the estimation error increases. Intuitively, increases in the estimation error makes the acquisition of the C-CSI less attractive for larger costs. The probability p again increases as the C-CSI cost decreases, but now the expected pay-off of a primary also increases.
The NE pricing strategies are again randomized. In the basic model, when the primary accurately estimates that the competitor's channel is unavailable, it selects the highest possible price v w.p. 1. However, when there are C-CSI errors, the competitor's channel may be available even when it estimates that it is not. Thus, a primary selects a lower price.
Impact of Unequal C-CSI Acquisition Costs: We also investigate the setting where C-CSI acquisition costs may differ across the primaries (Section V). We show that [T, p i ] strategies are NE for primary i . Each primary has the same threshold T but different probabilities p i , where p i is larger for the primary with the lower cost. The expected payoff of the higher cost primary is the same as it would have obtained if there was no provision of acquiring the C-CSI. In contrast to the basic model, the expected payoff of the primary with a lower cost is higher compared to the other primary.
The primaries again randomize their prices, where the lower-cost primary chooses its price from a larger range when it acquires the C-CSI (and a smaller range when it does not). In contrast to the basic model, the higher-cost primary also has a point mass at the highest price in the price distribution when it does not acquire the C-CSI, i.e., the higher-cost primary selects higher prices with higher probabilities when it does not acquire the C-CSI.
Impact of Heterogeneous Availabilities: We consider the impact of different availability probabilities across the primaries (Section VI). Again, we show that the NE strategy is of the form [T, p]. In this case, the primary with a higher availability has a higher threshold and a higher probability of acquiring the C-CSI. The expected pay-off of the higher-availability primary is greater, and interestingly, the expected pay-off of the other primary decreases as the cost for acquiring the C-CSI decreases which negates the conventional wisdom that the payoff of a primary should not decrease as the cost of acquiring the C-CSI decreases. We also show that the pricing strategy of each primary is randomized over a given interval. The higher-availability primary which selects a price from a larger interval when it acquires the C-CSI compared to when it does not.
Related Literature: Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics (dating back to the classic work of Bertrand [9] ) as well as in the wireless setting. For wireless applications, we divide the entire genre of works in two parts: i) Papers in which prices are set via an auction (e.g. [10] , [11] ), and ii) Papers, such as ours, which model price competition as a non co-operative game ( [12]- [31] ). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to include the option of acquiring the C-CSI in the strategy space of the players. Additionally, compared to the first category of papers, our model is readily scalable and a central auctioneer is not required. Most of the papers in the second category considered that the primary is aware of the competitor's channel state, which is also the case in the Bertrand model [9] . The exceptions are [26] - [29] , [32] which considered primaries can not acquire the C-CSI, so that each primary selects its price not knowing the CCS. In contrast, we allow primaries the option of acquiring the C-CSI. A primary now needs to judiciously decide whether to acquire the C-CSI and selects a price based on the result of this decision. In our setting, a primary is also unaware whether the other primary has acquired its CSI, while in [26] - [29] , [32] a primary knows that other primaries do not have the C-CSI. Naturally, these papers did not consider the impact of the C-CSI acquisition costs, estimation error and different channel availability probabilities.
Proofs are deferred to the archived version [6] unless otherwise specified.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secondary spectrum market with two primaries (players) and one secondary. 5 We provide the basic model in Section II-A; generalizations are given in Section II-B. Commonly used notations are in Table I .
A. Basic Model
We consider a model in which spectrum leases occur over a sequence of fixed time-slots and focus on one such time-slot. 6 The duration of a time-slot could range from minutes to hours depending on the underlying technologies and other considerations (e.g., the overhead in running the market).
Here the main consideration is that if a primary announces a price for its channel, it commits to allowing secondary usage of the channel for the next time-slot. The availability of a primary's channel will depend in part on the primary's own traffic. We define the state of a channel to be 1 if it is available and 0, otherwise. 7 Each primary's channel is 5 If there are more than one secondary, then the decision of the primary is trivial since it can always sell its channel at the highest price. Our model can also accommodate the setting where the number of secondaries is not known a priori. 6 In practice primaries and secondaries may take a longer term view, requiring a dynamic game model; we leave such considerations for future work. 7 Availability could also depend on the rate available to a secondary being large enough, which in turn might depend on estimates of fading and interference levels over the next time-slot. These can also be viewed as part of the CCS, though in such cases a better model might be to allow for the state of the channel to vary with the rate as in [27] , [32] (see also [6] ). available w.p. q, where 1 > q > 0 and q is common knowledge. If C-CSI is not acquired, a primary is unaware of the competitor's channel state. 8 If a primary's channel is available, the primary can sell it for secondary use during the next time slot. In this case, it decides whether to acquire the C-CSI before deciding the price for its channel. For example, if the market opens at time t, then at time t −δ, a primary decides whether to acquire the C-CSI or not. By acquiring C-CSI, a primary obtains an estimate of the competitor's channel state (CCS) for the entire duration of the slot. The C-CSI estimation is accurate and thus, a primary knows the exact CCS. The primary incurs a cost s if it estimates the C-CSI.
Each primary then decides its price and posts it to the secondary at the beginning of the slot. 9 If the channels of both the primaries are available, then, the secondary will buy the lower priced channel. If the two available channels have the same price, a secondary will choose either w.p. 1/2.
B. Generalization of the Model 1) Estimation Error:
When a primary acquires the C-CSI, it estimates the CCS for the entire slot duration. Because of the channel fading, noise in the environment, random variation of the usage pattern of the channel, that estimation may be erroneous. In Section IV, we consider that the estimated CCS is accurate only with probability q s . If a primary acquires the C-CSI, then, it will estimate that the CCS is 1 (0, resp.) w.p. q s if the original CCS is 1 (0, resp.). Without loss of generality, we assume that 10 1/2 < q s ≤ 1. Note that when q s = 1, there is no estimation error and thus, the basic model is a special case of this model.
2) Different Costs of Acquiring the C-CSI: In Section V we generalize the basic model to allow each primary i to incur a different cost, s i for acquiring the C-CSI.
3) Different Channel Availabilities: In Section VI, we generalize our model to allow each primary i to have different availabilities, q i .
C. Payoff of a Primary
If primary i sets its price at x and it decides to acquire the C-CSI, then, its payoff is
Note that when both the primaries incur the same cost to acquire the C-CSI, then we have s i = s. When a primary does not acquire the C-CSI, then its payoff at price x is x − c, if the primary is able to sell its channel, 0, otherwise.
D. Strategy of a Primary
If the channel of a primary is available, 11 it will take a decision D ∈ {Y, N}, where Y denotes estimating the C-CSI at cost s and N denotes not acquiring the C-CSI. The Primary also sets a price for its channel. Note that the primaries' decisions are simultaneous so that no primary is aware of the decision of its competitor when making its own decision. If a primary selects Y , it selects a price using either a distribution F 1 (·) or F 0 (·) depending on whether it estimates the CCS as 1 or 0, respectively. If a primary selects N, then it does not acquire the C-CSI, so it only selects its price using a single distribution F(·).
Definition 1: The strategy S i of
is a probability mass function over the strategies (D, F). The strategy of the primary other than i is denoted as S −i .
Definition 2: E{u i (S i , S −i )} denotes the expected payoff of primary i when its channel is available, it uses strategy S i and the other primary uses strategy 12 S −i .
E. Solution Concept
We consider a non-cooperative game where each primary only wants to maximize its own expected payoff. We use the (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept.
Definition 3: A Nash equilibrium (NE) (S 1 , S 2 ) is a strategy profile such that no primary can improve its expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from its strategy 13 [33] . Thus,
A strategy profile is symmetric if S i = S j for players i and j .
III. RESULTS OF THE BASIC MODEL
We first investigate the basic model depicted in Sect. II-A. Before stating our result we highlight some quandaries in this setting. Conventional wisdom may suggest that a primary should acquire the C-CSI (if the cost is low) and gain a higher payoff. However, this is not definitive. The payoff of a primary (1, say) inherently depends on the decision of other primary (2, say). If primary 2 acquires the C-CSI, then it selects a lower price when the channel of primary 1 is available, thus, in response, 14 primary 1 also selects a lower price in the NE, which reduces its payoff. It is also not clear even if a primary decides to acquire the C-CSI at what values of s it will do so or what pricing strategy it should use. We resolve all these quandaries. 11 If a primary's channel is unavailable, its decision is immaterial. 12 We consider the expected payoff of a primary as the expected payoff conditioned on the channel of the primary being available. If the channel of the primary is unavailable, it will attain a payoff of 0 and so its unconditional expected payoff is simply this quantity scaled by q i . 13 In the language of Bayesian games, the expectation here is with respect to a player's belief about the availability of the competitor's channel (which as we have noted can be viewed as the competitor's type). The belief about the competitor's type (i.e. availability) also changes depending on the information the primary has. Given the consistent belief assumption, we simply refer to the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a NE in the following. 14 In an NE, each player selects a best response strategy in response of the strategy of the other player.
A. Class of Starategies 1) A Class of Strategies for Acquiring the C-CSI:
We first define a class of strategies for selecting D ∈ {Y, N}.
Definition 4: A [T, p] strategy is a strategy where a primary selects
The probability p may be a function of s.
We show that in the basic model and in the generalizations, a [T, p] strategy is a NE where p = f (s) for some decreasing function f (·). It is intuitive that f (·) is decreasing and f (s) = 0 when s > (v − c) as the maximum expected payoff that a primary attains is v −c. We, however, show that f (s) can be 0 even for smaller values of s. We also show that p never becomes 1 for any positive value of s. We fully characterize the function f (·) and the threshold T above which a primary does not select Y .
2) A Class of Pricing Strategies: Now, we introduce two classes of price distributions; we will show that NE pricing strategies are one of the following forms:
where γ p , α p , β p , L 1 , U 1 are constants (can be functions of p) which we define explicitly when we state an NE pricing strategy:-
where γ 1, p , α 1, p , β 1, p , γ 2, p , α 2, p , β 2, p , L 1,1 , L 2,1 and U 2 are constants (can be functions of p) that will be defined explicitly when we state an NE pricing strategy. In both the above classes 1 − φ 1 (·) and 1 − φ 2 (·) decrease at a rate of O(1/x) over their support.Also φ 2 (·) increases in two segments (one from L 1,1 to L 2,1 and one from L 2,1 to U 2 ) whereas φ 1 (·) increases only in one segment (from L 1 to U 1 ).
B. Main Results
Our main results in this scenario are:- where T = q(v − c)(1 − q) (Theorems 3 and 4). Note that T increases when the uncertainty of the availability of the channel increases. Intuitively, when either q is large or small, the uncertainty of the competitor's channel decreases; thus, a primary selects N for higher values of s. We show that p is a decreasing function of s. • The expected payoff that a primary attains in any NE strategy profile is (v−c)(1−q) (Theorems 3 and 4), which is independent of the value of s. [26] shows that when a primary can not acquire the CSI of the competitor, then its payoff is (v −c)(1−q). Thus, the ability to acquire the C-CSI does not impact the expected payoff of a primary. • Theorem 3 shows that when each primary selects N w.p. 1, then it randomizes its price from the interval [p, v] . Theorem 4 shows that when a primary randomizes between Y and N and selects Y (N, resp.) and its competitor's channel is available, then the primary selects its price from the interval [p 1 ,p 2 ] ([p 2 , v], resp.). Intuitively, as the uncertainty of the competitor's availability increases, a primary selects a higher price. We also show thatp 1 decreases as s decreases. Thus, a primary selects its price from a larger interval when it randomizes between Y and N. Now, we describe the results in detail.
Theorem 1: There is no Nash equilibrium where both the primaries choose Y w.p. 1 when s > 0.
Outline of Proof: Assume both players choose Y , so that they know each other's channel state. Thus, if the channel of its competitor is unavailable, the primary will set its price at the v, otherwise, it will set its price at the lowest value c (as in the Bertrand Competition [9] ). The probability with which the channel of a primary is available is q. Thus, the expected payoff of a player is
Now consider the following unilateral deviation for primary 1: It selects N and sets its price at v w.p. 1. The channel of primary 1 will be bought when the channel of primary 2 is not available. Since primary 1 decides not to incur the cost s,
. This is strictly higher than (4) for s > 0. Hence, the strategy profile can not be an NE. This theorem means that at least one primary will be unaware of its competitor's channel state with a non-zero probability. The next theorem shows that it is also not possible in an NE for one primary to select Y w.p. 1 and other to select N w.p. 1.
Theorem 2: For positive s > 0, there is no NE where a primary selects Y w.p. 1 and the other selects N w.p. 1.
We provide the intuition behind the result. The primary (say, 1) which selects Y tends to select lower prices with higher probability when it knows that the channel of the other primary is available. Thus, in response primary 2 (which selects N) selects higher prices with higher probabilities in order to gain a high payoff in the event that the channel of primary 1 is unavailable since it knows that its probability of selling is very low in the event that the channel of primary 1 is available. Primary 1 can then gain a higher payoff by deviating to select N and higher prices as it does not have to incur the cost s. The detailed proof is in [6] . Next we examine NE where both primaries select N. Theorem 3: The strategy where each primary selects (N, φ), where pricing strategy φ(·) belongs to the class φ 1 (·) (described in (2)
The expected payoff of each primary is (v − c)(1 − q). Theorems 1, 2 and 3 show that if s is low, there is no NE where each primary selects either Y or N w.p. 1. Thus, at least one primary must randomize between Y and N. First we introduce some notations, let
Theorem 4: The following strategy profile is the unique NE
When choosing Y , the primary selects its price according to ψ 1 (·) when the CCS is 1, otherwise, it selects v w.p. 1. When choosing N, the primary selects price according to ψ 2 (·).
Here, ψ 1 (·) belongs to the class φ 1 (·) (given in (2)) with
The expected payoff that a primary attains in the NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1 − q). Example 1: We illustrate the computation of the NE streategy for an example where v = 50, c = 0, s = 8, and q = 0.5. Since s < q(v − c)(1 − q), the NE strategy is given by Theorem 4 which gives p = 0.5294. Using p, the strategies ψ 1 (·) and ψ 2 (·) are readily obtained and shown in Fig. 1 .
Discussion: Note from the above theorem that when s is low there exists an NE where both the primaries randomize between Y and N. It is also easy to discern that as s decreases, p the probability with which a primary selects Y increases and as s → 0, p → 1 (Fig. 2) .
Note that q(1 − q) is a measure of uncertainty; if the uncertainty is higher, the threshold is also higher. C-CSI acquisition prob. p as a function of q for: v = 11, c = 1, s = 2. When either q ≤ 0.28 or q ≥ 0.72, p = 0. p is maximized at q * = 0.55, maximum value of p is 0.35.
The maximum value of q(1 − q) is 1/4; a primary never selects Y if s ≥ (v − c)/4. By differentiating, it is easy to discern that p is maximized at q * = 1 − √ s/(v − c) ( Fig. 3) . As s decreases, the primary selects Y even for higher values of q.
Theorems 3 and 4 imply that the expected payoff of a primary is (v −c)(1 −q). Note that when the primaries always know each other's channel states, from (4), the expected payoff is (v − c) (1 − q) . When the primaries are constrained to select only N, the expected payoff is again (v − c)(1 − q) [26] , [27] . Hence, our result builds a bridge between the two extremes. Specifically, it shows that the cost s for acquiring the C-CSI does not impact the expected payoff of a primary.
In [6] we show that some of the results can be extended to the more general settings. For example, we show that in the setting when there are more than two primaries and each primary either acquires the C-CSI of all the competitors or does not acquire the C-CSI of em any of the competitors, the expected payoff is still independent of C-CSI acquisition cost. We also show that when the utility of a secondary varies based on the transmission rates offered by the channels (i.e. the channel can be more than two states), the expected payoff of a primary is also independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost.
IV. IMPACT OF ESTIMATION ERRORS
We, now, turn to the model with C-CSI errors specified in Section II-B.1. Specifically, if a primary estimates the CCS, the estimation is accurate only with probability q s (1/2 < q s ≤ 1). The impact of estimation error on the decision and the payoff of each primary is not a priori clear. Conventional wisdom may suggest that the C-CSI error should decrease the payoff. However, this is not definitive. If there is no error, then a primary selects a low price due to the presence of the competitor when it estimates that the CCS is 1. However, if there is an estimation error, the primary selects a higher price without reducing the winning probability even when it estimates that the CCS is 1 as there is a possibility that the competitor's channel may not be available. This may increase the payoff of a primary compared to the case when there is no estimation error. Even if the selection of Y belongs to the class [T, p] (Recall Definition 4), the dependence of T and p on the estimation error is also not a priori clear. The pricing strategy also depends on the estimation error. Our goal is to characterize the NE strategies and the payoffs of the primaries.
A. Main Results
We now summarize our main findings in this section :-• We show that there exists a NE strategy 15 which is a [T, p] strategy (Definition 4) with T = q(2q s − 1) (v − c)(1 − q) (Theorems 5, 6). Compared to the basic model, we find a different threshold, which decreases as the accuracy q s decreases, i.e., primaries select N w.p. 1 for larger values of s as q s decreases. Intuitively, the uncertainty of the C-CSI increases as the estimation error increases even when primary selects Y . Hence, a primary selects N w.p. 1 for smaller values of s. We also characterize p as a function of s and show that p decreases monotonically with s. Numerically, we also show that p increases with q s . • The expected payoff of each primary is strictly higher than (v − c)(1 − q) when a primary randomizes between Y and N (i.e. s < T ) and q s < 1. Recall from the basic model that the expected payoff of a primary is (v − c)(1 − q) irrespective of the values of s. Surprisingly, with estimation errors the expected pay-off of each primary increases. Also, in contrast to the basic model, the pay-off of each primary depends on s and increases as s decreases when q s < 1. • In NE pricing strategy:
-When a primary selects Y and estimates that the CCS is 1, it selects its price from the interval [p 1 , L N ]. -When a primary selects N, it selects its price from the interval [L N , L 0 ]. -When a primary selects Y and estimates that the CCS is 0, it selects its price from the interval [L 0 , v]. If q s = 1, a primary always selects v w.p. 1 when the primary selects Y and the channel state of the competitor is 0 since the primary will always be able to sell its channel because of the unavailability of its competitor. However, when q s < 1, the potential estimation error causes a primary to randomize among prices from an interval [L 0 , v] even when the primary estimates that the CCS is 0. Also note that when a primary estimates that the CCS is 1 (0, resp.), then its competitor is more likely to be available (unavailable, resp.). Hence, the primary selects lower (higher, resp.) prices compared to the setting where a primary selects N. We numerically show that the variance increases with the decrease in s and increase in q s (Fig. 9 ). Now, we describe the results in details. In Section IV-C we numerically show important properties of the NE strategy and the payoff of the primary as a function of s and q s .
B. Detailed Analysis
First, we state some results which we use throughout this section. If a primary estimates that the CCS is 1, then the actual CCS is 1 w.p. 15 The NE strategy is shown to be unique in the symmetric class. Thus, similar to the basic model, there is no NE where both primaries select Y w.p. 1. Since the NE strategy is unique in the symmetric class, thus, primaries do not need to coordinate with each other in order to implement the NE strategy profile. (·) , ψ N (·), ψ Y,0 (·). THE PARAMETERS ARE GIVEN IN (7) AND (8)
is the heaviside step function or unit step function.
Similarly, if a primary estimates that the CCS is 0, then the actual CCS is 1 w.p.
Note that when q s = 1, then q 1,1 and q 1,0 become 1 and 0, respectively. The next result addresses the case when the cost s is sufficiently high.
Theorem 5: When s ≥ q(v −c)(1 −q)(2q s −1), there exists a NE in which both primaries follow the same strategy as in Theorem 3 and obtain the same expected pay-off. Note that both players select N this is equivalent to the basic model (since no estimation is made). Now, we show that when s < q(2q s −1)(v −c)(1−q), then, in an NE, the primaries randomize between Y and N. We first introduce some parameters in terms of p whose significance is shown later.
When q s = 1, the parameters in (7) are greatly simplified as-p
Note that L 0 andp 3 are equal to the highest possible value when q s = 1.
, the following is a NE strategy: Each primary selects Y w.p. p and N w.p. 1 − p where p satisfies
andp 1 ,p 2 andp 3 are given in (7) (Note thatp 2 andp 1 are functions of p). While selecting Y , each primary selects its price from ψ Y,1 (·) (Table II) if it estimates that the CCS is 1 and from ψ Y,0 (·) (Table II) if it estimates that the CCS is 0. While selecting N, each primary selects its price using ψ N (·) ( Table II) .
The expected payoff that each primary gets isp 2 − c. Observation 1: There exists a unique solution in p ∈ (0, 1) satisfying (9) when 0 < s < (v − c)(1 − q)(2qq s − q). As s decreases p increases.
Next, we show that the expected payoff of a primary is trictly greater than (v − c)(1 − q) when q s < 1 and decreases in s. Lemma 1: When q s < 1,p 2 −c decreases in s and is strictly greater than (v −c)(1 −q) when s < q(v −c)(1 −q)(2q s −1).
Note from Theorem 6 that the expected payoff attained by a primary under the NE isp 2 − c. From the basic model (and also from (8)) note that the expected payoff of a primary is (v − c)(1 − q) when q s = 1. Thus, the above lemma entails that the expected payoff of each primary increases when a primary randomizes between Y and N in presence of C-CSI error. This contradicts the intuition that the lower errors should lead to better payoffs. Also note that when q s = 1 the strategy in Theorem 6 reduces to the strategy in Theorem 4.
Example 2: We illustrate the NE pricing strategy in Theorem 6 for an example where v = 50, c = 0, s = 4, q s = 0.8, q = 0.5. Since s < (2q s − 1)q(v − c)(1 − q), the NE pricing strategy is given in Theorem 6. Numerically, we obtain the unique p satisfying (9) . Given p, ψ Y,1 (·), ψ N (·) and ψ Y,1 (·) are readily obtained and shown in Fig. 4 . Fig. 5 shows that the C-CSI acquisition probability p increases in q s . Intuitively, as q s increases the uncertainty of the CCS decreases when a primary selects Y ; thus, a primary selects Y with a higher probability. Fig. 5 also shows that the growth of p is sub-linear with q s . Fig. 6 shows the variation of a primary's expected payoff with q s . When 0.5 < q s ≤ 0.67, a primary selects N w.p. 1; hence, the expected payoff is (v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff increases in q s when 0.67 < q s ≤ 0.83. After that the payoff decreases and eventually, becomes equal to (v − c)(1 − q) when q s = 1. Thus, the payoff of a primary is higher when there is C-CSI errors compared to no errors.
C. Numerical Results
Note from Lemma 1 that the expected payoff of a primary decreases in s when a primary selects Y with a positive probability. Fig. 7 illustrates this result. Specifically, as s increases, the expected payoff decreases when s < q(v − c) (1 − q)(2q s − 1) = 6.5. Additionally, the expected payoff decreases sub-linearly. When s ≥ 6.5, a primary only selects N and attains an expected payoff of (v − c) (1 − q) , thus, the payoff becomes independent of s in this regime. Fig. 8 shows that p, the probability with which a primary selects Y decreases in s. When s ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q)(2q s − 1) = 6.25, the primary selects N w.p. 1 ,i.e. p = 0. Additionally, Fig. 8 shows that p decreases sub-linearly as s increases. Fig. 9 shows the variation of the variance of the primary's price with s and q s . Note that the variance decreases as s increases. Intuitively, as s decrease a primary selects Y with a higher probability and the interval from which it selects its price increases. primary selects N w.p. 1 and a price using the distribution φ(·) which is independent of s,thus, the variance becomes independent of s. Note that Fig. 9 also shows that the variance also decreases as q s decreases. Intuitively, as q s decreases, a primary selects N with a higher probability (see Fig. 5 ), thus, the variance decreases. The mean price paid by the secondary is also maximum when s = 0 and q s = 1. Thus, the lowest cost and highest q s increases the price paid by the secondary without increasing the expected payoff of the primary.
V. UNEQUAL C-CSI ACQUISITION COSTS
Now, we investigate the case where each primary i incurs a different cost s i to acquire C-CSI, where s i are common information. Without loss of generality we assume that 0 < s 1 < s 2 . To simplify the exposition, as in the basic model, we assume that there is no estimation error. We assume that s i are common information.
The impact of different acquisition costs on each primary's payoff and the frequency with which each primary selects Y is not a priori clear. The pricing decision of each primary also depends on the frequencies with which each primary selects Y . We characterize these in the following.
A. Main Results
We summarize our main findings here:- q) . Note that T is the same as the basic model, however, since different primaries have different acquisition costs, p i s are different. For example, when s 1 < T ≤ s 2 , then primary 1 selects Y w.p. p 1 , but primary 2 does not select Y . Even when s 2 < T , then primary 2 will select a p 2 where p 1 > p 2 as s 1 < s 2 . • The difference in the acquisition costs lead to different payoffs for the primaries. In contrast to the basic model, primary 1 attains a higher expected payoff compared to primary 2 when primary 1 selects Y with a positive probability (i.e. s 1 < T ) (Theorems 8, 9 ). The expected payoff of primary 1 becomes close to the payoff of the primary 2 as the difference between s 1 and s 2 decreases. The expected payoff of primary 2 is in fact independent of s 2 and is equal to the payoff it would have obtained if it could not acquire the C-CSI. Thus, the option of acquiring the C-CSI does not increase the payoff of the primary 2. • Primary i selects its price from the interval [L,p i ] ([p i , v], resp.) , when the primary i randomizes between Y and N and selects Y (N, resp.) and the competitor's channel is available. There are some differences in the pricing structure compared to the basic model. We show thatp 1 >p 2 whereasp 1 =p 2 in the basic model. In the basic model, the price selection strategy belongs to the class φ 1 (·) (cf.
(2)). However, when q) , the price selection strategy of primary 2 under N belongs to the class φ 2 (·) (cf. (3)). Additionally, when s 2 < q(v − c)(1 − q), price selection strategy of primary 1 under Y also belongs to the class φ 2 (·). • We show that Primary 2 selects v with a positive probability when it selects N in the regime when primary 1 randomizes between Y and N (i.e. 9) . Thus, the pricing strategy of primary 2 has a discontinuity at v in contrast to the basic model where primaries select prices from continuous distribution when they select N. Intuitively, under N primary 2 has two options-i) selects a higher price (sells its channel at least when the channel of primary 1 is unavailable), or (ii) selects a lower price (increases the probability of winning). When s 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q), primary 1 most likely knows the channel state of primary 2 and selects a lower price when the channel of primary 2 is available, in response, primary 2 instead of selecting a lower price (as it knows it will gain very low payoff) it selects a higher price with higher probability under N to sell its channel at least in the event when primary 1 is unavailable.
B. Detailed Analysis
Our first result in this section shows that Theorem 7: When q) , then in the unique NE, both the primaries select N w.p. 1 and select their prices according to the same distribution as described in Theorem 3 and attain the same expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q). Now, we consider the setting where q) . We show that there exists a NE where primary 1 randomizes between Y and N, and primary 2 selects N. First, we introduce some notations which we use throughout this section. 
, the following is the unique BE strategy profile: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p 1 and N w.p. 1− p 1 ( p 1 is given in (11) ) and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y , if the channel of primary 2 is available, then primary 1 selects its price according to ψ 1,Y (·) (Table III) , otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. While selecting N, primary 1 selects its price according to ψ 1,N (·) (Table III) . Primary 2 selects its price according to ψ 2 (·) ( Table III) .
The expected payoff that primary 1 attains isp N − c and the expected payoff of primary 2 is (v − c)(1 − q).
Discussion: We show in [6] that Observation 2: ψ 2 (·) has a jump at v. Thus, in contrast to the basic model, primary 2 selects a price from the distribution which has a point mass at v. The continuity of ψ 1,Y (·) and ψ 1,N (·) can be easily concluded.
Since s 1 < q(v −c)(1 −q) the payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to the primary 2. The expected payoff of primary 1 also increases with the decrease in s 1 .
Also,p 1 increases as s 1 decreases (cf. (11) ). Thus, ψ 1,Y (·) has larger support as s 1 decreases.
Lastly, we show that if s 2 < q(v −c)(1−q) then, there exists an NE where both the primaries randomize between Y and N. Again, we introduce some notations which are used to specify the price distributions (Table IV) in this regime.
Theorem 9: When s 2 < q(v − c)(1 − q), the following strategy profile is the unique NE: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p 1 and N w.p. 1 − p 1 and primary 2 selects Y w.p. p 2 and N w.p. 1 − p 2 where p 1 and p 2 are given in (13) . While selecting Y , primary i = 1, 2 selects its price according to ψ i,Y (·) when the channel of primary j, j = i is available and will select the price v if the channel of primary j is unavailable; while selecting N, primary i selects its price according to ψ i,N (·). ψ i,Y (·) and ψ i,N (·) are stated in Table IV . The expected payoff that primary 1 attains is
Discussion: It is easy to discern that ψ 1,N (·) and ψ 2,Y (·) are continuous. We show in [6] that ψ 1,Y (·) is also continuous. We also show that under N the price distribution of primary 2 has a point mass at v [6] . Thus, primary 2 selects a price from the distribution which has a point mass when primary 2 does not acquire the C-CSI (similar to Observation 2).
Since s 2 > s 1 , thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to primary 2. Note from Theorems 7, 8, and 9 that the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v −c) q) , thus the expected payoff of primary 1 is lower compared to the setting where s 2 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q). Also note from Theorems 7, 8, and 9 that the expected payoff of primary 2 is independent of s 2 or s 1 . Thus, decrease in s 2 does not increase the payoff of primary 2, it only decreases the payoff of primary 1.
Since s 1 < s 2 , p 1 > p 2 (cf. (14) ). The difference between p 1 and p 2 decreases as the difference between s 1 and s 2 decreases.
Note that L decreases as s 2 decreases. Since the lowest end-point of the support is L, a primary selects its price from a larger interval as s 2 decreases. It is easy to discern that p i , i = 1, 2 decrease with s i (cf. (14) ). Primary i selects its price from a larger interval (smaller interval, resp.) when it selects Y (N, resp.) and the competitor's channel is available in the regime when it randomizes between Y and N (
VI. UNEQUAL CHANNEL AVAILABILITY PROBABILITIES
Without loss of generality, we assume that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q 1 and the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. q 2 where q 1 > q 2 . All other parameters are the same as in the basic model.
Note that if a competitor has a very high (or very low) availability, there is less information obtained by acquiring the C-CSI; thus primaries will be less likely to acquire C-CSI in these extremes. However, it is not a priori clear exactly how the C-CSI acquisition probability will vary with the availability probabilities and how this will impact the primaries' pricing.
We have seen in the basic model that the pay-off of a primary does not depend on the cost s. However, with estimation errors or unequal C-CSI cost the pay-off may decrease with increasing costs. This may lead one to think that the payoffs should always be non-increasing functions of the cost. However, this is not a foregone conclusion as the change in cost effect not only a primary's actions but those of its competitor in non-trivial ways. We characterize the NE pricing strategies and the payoffs of the primaries.
A. Main Results
We first discuss our main findings:-• The unique NE strategy for primary i is of the form [T i , p i ] (Definition 4). However, T i is different for different primaries due to different availability probabilities. Our result shows that T 1 = q 2 (v−c)(1−q 2 ) (Theorem 10) and Theorem 11) where T 1 > T 2 . Note that in the basic model, we have shown that the threshold depends on the variance of the availability of the competitor's channel. Thus,
is expected. However, the expression of T 2 is surprising; it not only depends on q 1 , but also depends on q 2 . Also note that when T 2 ≤ s < T 1 , primary 2 selects Y w.p. 0, but primary 1 selects Y w.p. p 1 . Even when s < T 2 , p i s are different with p 1 > p 2 (Theorem 12). Thus, surprisingly primary 1 selects Y with a higher probability irrespective of the channel availability probabilities. • Different availability probabilities also lead to different payoffs for the primaries. In contrast to the basic model, the expected payoff of primary 1 is higher than that of primary 2 when primary 1 selects Y with a positive probability (Theorems 11 and 12). The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. However, the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases as s decreases. Thus, the expected payoff of a primary decreases with the ease of acquiring the C-CSI which negates conventional wisdom. The expected payoff of primary 2 becomes closer to that of primary 1 as q 2 becomes closer to q 1 . • Price strategies also exhibit some similarities with the basic model. Specifically, primary i selects its price from (15) the interval [L,p i ] ([p i , v], resp.) when it randomizes between Y and N and selects Y (N, resp.) and the competitor's channel is available. However, since primaries have different availability probabilities, the price selection strategies have some differences compared to the basic model. For example,p 1 >p 2 . Thus, primary 2 selects a lower price when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available. Under N, primary 1 selects a price from the distribution which has a point mass at v. In contrast, each primary selects its price from a continuous distribution function under N in the basic model. Intuitively, since primary 1 has higher channel availability probability, it selects higher prices with higher probabilities. 16 In Section VI-B we describe the results in detail. In Section VI-C we numerically characterize the payoffs and the strategies of the primaries as functions of q 1 , q 2 and s.
B. Detailed Analysis
Our first result shows that Theorem 10: If s ≥ q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ) then in the unique NE, both the primaries select N w.p. 1. The expected payoff of both the primaries is (v − c)(1 − q 2 ).
Note that when s ≥ q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ) both the primaries attain identical expected payoff though the availability probabilities are different. Now, we show that when
(v −c)(1−q 2 ) then there is an NE where primary 1 randomizes between Y and N, however, primary 2 only selects N. First, we introduce some notations which are used to describe the NE pricing strategy. 16 Note that when the costs of acquiring the CSIs are different (Section V), primary 2 has a jump at v when it selects N . However, since primary 1 has a higher availability probability in this setting, selecting higher prices under N with higher probabilities is not a best response for primary 2.
Theorem 11:
, the unique NE strategy profile is: Primary 1 selects Y w.p. p 1 (given in (15) ) and N w.p. 1 − p 1 and primary 2 selects N w.p. 1. While selecting Y , primary 1 selects its price according to ψ Y (·) (Table V) when the channel of primary 2 is available and selects v w.p. 1 when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable. While selecting N, primary 1 selects its price according to ψ 1,N (·) ( Table V) . Primary 2 selects its price according to ψ N (·) ( Table V) .
The expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1 − q 2 ) and the expected payoff of primary 2 is s/q 2 .
Discussion: It is easy to discern that ψ Y (·) and ψ 1,N (·) are continuous. We, also, show in [6] that ψ N (·) is a continuous function. However, ψ 1,N (·) has a jump at v which we have shown in [6] .
Note that the support of ψ Y ([L,p]) and the support of ψ N ([L, v]) overlap with each other unlike in the basic model. Since s < q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ), the expected payoff of primary 2 is lower compared to the expected payoff of primary 1.
L decreases when s decreases (by 15). Since L is lower end point of price distribution, thus, primaries select their prices from a larger interval as s decreases. Also note from (15) that p increases as s decreases. Thus, ψ Y (·) (ψ 1,N (·), resp.) has a larger (smaller, resp.) support as s decreases.
Next, we show that when s <
there exists an NE where both the primaries randomize between Y and N. Again we first introduce some notations
Theorem 12: Consider the following strategy profile: Primary i, i = 1, 2 selects Y w.p. p i (cf. (16) & (17) ) and N w.p. 1 − p i . While selecting Y , primary i = 1, 2 selects its price according to ψ i,Y (·) (Table VI) when the channel of primary j, j = i is available and selects v when the channel of primary j is unavailable. While selecting N, primary i selects its price according to ψ i,N (·) ( Table VI) .
The above strategy profile is the unique NE when
Discussion:The C-CSI acquisition probability not only depends on the competitor's availability probability, but also its own availability probability (cf. (16) & (17)). We also show in [6] that Lemma 2: p 1 > p 2 when q 1 > q 2 . Thus, primary 2 selects Y with a lower probability compared to primary 1. Both p 1 and p 2 increase as s decreases and go to 1 as s → 0.
The payoff of primary 2 is lower compared to primary 1. The payoff of primary 2 becomes equal to that of primary 1 when q 1 → q 2 which we have also seen in the basic model. Theorems 10, 11 and 12 show that the expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. From Theorems 10, 11, and 12 we also obtain that the expected payoff of primary 2 decreases with s which negates intuition which suggests the expected payoff of a primary must not decrease as the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases.
Note that L decreases as s decreases (cf. (17)). Thus, a primary selects its price from a larger interval as s decreases. It is also easy to discern thatp i , i = 1, 2 (cf. (16), (17) & (18)) increases with the decrease in s. Thus, as s decreases ψ i,Y (·) (ψ i,N , resp.) have larger (smaller, resp.) support. Though ψ i,Y (·), and ψ 2,N (·) are continuous, ψ 1,N (·) has a jump at 18 v. Thus primary 1 selects higher prices with a higher probability under N. Fig. 10 shows that p i , i = 1, 2 are non-increasing functions of s. When s = 0, then p i = 1. When 0 < s < q 2 (v − c) (1 − q 1 )/(1 − q 1 + q 2 ), p 1 > p 2 . When q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 1 )/ (1 − q 1 + q 2 ) ≤ s < q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ), p 1 is positive, but p 2 is 0. The difference between p 1 and p 2 is maximum at s = q 2 (v −c)(1−q 1 )/(1−q 1 +q 2 ). When s ≥ q 2 (v −c)(1−q 2 ) both the primaries select N w.p. 1 and thus, p i = 0. 18 The above is also true in Theorems 10 and 11 Fig. 11 . Variation of the expected payoffs of primaries with s in the same setting as in Fig. 10 . Fig. 12 . Variation of p 1 and p 2 with q 1 and q 2 . In the left-hand figure we use q 1 = 0.6, c = 0, v = 50, s = 4 and for the right-hand figure we use q 2 = 0.4, v = 50, c = 0, s = 4. Fig. 11 shows the variation of the expected payoffs of primaries with s. The expected payoff of primary 1 is independent of s. When s ≥ q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ), the expected payoff of primary 2 is independent of s and identical to the payoff of primary 1. However, it decreases in s when s < q 2 (v − c)(1 − q 2 ). Thus, the payoff of primary 2 decreases with the decrease in the C-CSI acquisition cost which contradicts the conventional wisdom. Apparent reason behind this anomaly is that primary 1 acquires the C-CSI with higher probabilities as s decrease and selects a low price when the channel of primary 2 is available. Since the channel of primary 1 is available with a higher probability, primary 2 is aware that its channel state is more likely to be known to the primary 1 when s is low. In response, primary 2 has to select a lower price in order to increase its probability of selling its channel which in turn reduces the payoff of primary 2. Fig. 12 shows the variations of p i , i = 1, 2 with q i , i = 1, 2. Note from the left hand figure of Fig. 12 that when q 2 is low, both the primaries select N w.p. 1, thus, p i = 0. When q 2 > 0.25, p 1 becomes positive, but p 2 is 0. When q 2 > 0.4, p 2 also becomes positive. Since q 2 increases, primary 1 finds the channel of primary 2 more often and primary 1 has to select a lower price. Thus, p 1 decreases when q 2 > 0.4 which enables p 2 to increases. Eventually, when q 2 → q 1 , p 2 → p 1 .
C. Numerical Results
Note from the right hand figure of Fig. 12 that when q 1 = q 2 , p 1 = p 2 . As q 1 increases p 2 decreases as primary 2 will find that the primary 1 is available more often if it selects Y which renders selecting Y unprofitable. Eventually p 2 becomes 0. Note that p 1 initially increases with q 1 when p 2 decreases. When p 2 becomes 0, p 1 decreases with q 1 , however the decrement is low.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have considered several models to understand the impact of having a costly option for acquiring information about competitors (C-CSI) in a secondary spectrum. We began with a symmetric game between two primaries where C-CSI is perfect and saw the the C-CSI cost did not effect the primary's pay-offs. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. The option of acquiring the C-CSI does not increase the payoff of the primary with a lower acquisition cost and the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities. The NE pricing strategies in each setting are also characterized; in general prices are randomized over a given interval, however, there exist several structural differences among different settings.
There are many directions this work could be extended. One such direction is studying models with more than two primaries in presence of estimation errors, or unequal availabilities. The complete characterization of the NE strategy when the secondary's utility changes depending on the transmission rate offered by the available channels also remains open (some initial works along these lines is in [6] ).
